Ohne jetzt die ‚medienttechnischen‘ Aspekte beantworten zu können… wir brauchen zumindest eine Zahlenbasis. Woher?
Ich habe einen Artikel aus ‚Foreign Affairs‘ vom Juli 2022 gefunden:
The Great Global Rearmament: Ukraine and the Dangerous Rise in Military Spending (foreignaffairs.com)
Die Zeitschrift wird vom US ‚Council on Foreign Relations‘ herausgegeben (Reflex: US-imperialistisch), aber die Autoren des Artikels sind alle vom SIPRI in Stockholm, was dem ganzen doch etwas ‚credibility‘ geben sollte.
Ein paar Zitate (Hervorhebungen von mir):
„Before Russia invaded Ukraine, global military spending had already reached what is at least a post-Cold War high of $2.1 trillion, up from $1.2 trillion in 1999 and $1.7 trillion in 1989.“
"In 2021, 2.2 percent of the planet’s GDP was spent on armed forces, or $268 per capita—more than double the $118 per capita in 1999.
Nach 2014:
- „NATO […] called on each member to dedicate two percent of its GDP to the military, and European military spending increased by 25 percent over the following seven years. Since then, the number of European NATO allies that met the two percent threshold rose from two to eight.“
- Denmark currently spends 1.4 percent of its GDP on the military, but it is expected to increase spending to two percent of GDP by 2033.
- The Netherlands, which allocates 1.4 percent of its GDP to the military, plans to almost immediately reach NATO’s two percent target by adding $5.2 billion to the armed forces this year.
- Poland is dramatically raising military spending, in part to double the number of its troops […] … plans to raise military spending from 2.1 percent to three percent, starting in 2023.
- Germany announced plans to create a special fund worth $104 billion to strengthen its military.
- Sweden […] is now poised to […] boost armed forces spending to two percent of its GDP. To do so, the Swedish government will raise military expenditures by almost 60 percent.
- U.S. military expenditures have risen by approximately 40 percent over the past two decades, driven first by the war on terrorism and now by growing geopolitical competition with China and Russia.
Zu Russland ist zu lesen:
" Russia has initiated three state armament programs. As a result, the country’s military spending has risen almost nonstop. Indeed, Russia was one of the few European countries that did not cut military spending in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Instead, after waging a 12-day war against Georgia, it set up new funding to modernize 70 percent of its military equipment by the end of 2020.
Ultimately, didn’t meet this ambitious timeline. A combination of harsh Western sanctions (implemented after Moscow annexed Crimea) and falling oil prices forced the Kremlin to trim the military budget in 2017 and 2018. But as the economy stabilized, Russia again began increasing defense spending. In 2021 alone, as Russia amassed troops along the Ukrainian border, the country’s military spending increased by 2.9 percent and reached $65.9 billion—equivalent to 4.1 percent of the country’s GDP.
" But even Russia’s expenditures look small when compared with China’s. After the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis […] Beijing began an extensive military modernization program. Chinese defense spending increased by ten percent on average every year for the next two decades, and the country’s now 27 uninterrupted years of increased military spending make for the longest such stretch for any state in the world. Chinese military expenditures reached $293 billion last year.
Beijing shows no signs of stopping. […] Xi’s objective is to achieve the “complete modernization” of the PLA by 2035 and to make China’s armed forces into a “world-class military” by 2049."
Das klingt nicht gut - schon gar nicht für Taiwan und Japan…
Deshalb ist es auch nicht verwunderlich, dass Japan massiv zulegt (letztes Jahr + 7,3%) und Australien für 100 Milliarden US-$ atomgetriebene U-Boote kauft.
Die Autoren verweisen auch kritisch darauf hin, dass diese massiven Ausgabensteigerungen zwangsläufig dazu führen werden, dass es global für z.B. Klima-Maßnahmen oder Welt-Ernährungsprogramme an Geld fehlen wird.
Duke hat mit seinem Einwand nicht ganz unrecht, dass viel Geld nur ein bedingt brauchbarer Indikator für tatsächliche militärische Fähigkeiten sind - neben der Bundeswehr scheint das jetzt ja auch durch die russische Armee bestätigt zu werden - also Geld ist nicht alles, aber ohne Geld geht erst recht nix, ob es uns gefällt oder nicht.